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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NOS. 44260 & 44261 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) CASSIA COUNTY NOS.  
v.     ) CR 2006-2149 & CR 2015-5044 
     ) 
THERON PATRICK CHARLEY, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Theron Charley contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motions to reconsider his sentences pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35).  
As such, this Court should reduce Mr. Charley’s sentences as it deems appropriate, or, 
alternatively, it should remand these cases to the district court for new decisions on 
those motions. 
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Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Charley pleaded guilty in a 2006 case to 
domestic battery.1  (See R., pp.125, 134.)  The State agreed to recommend a unified 
sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, suspended for a period of probation, and 
Mr. Charley was free to argue for less.  (R., pp.134-36.)  The presentence investigation 
report (hereinafter, PSI) noted that Mr. Charley’s struggles (including developing drug 
and alcohol addictions) had begun following his parents’ divorce, which he took 
particularly hard.  (PSI, pp.13, 22.)  He had tried to address those issues on his own, as, 
for example, he completed the Walker Center’s inpatient treatment program when he 
was 18 years old.  (PSI, p.11.)  He also earned his GED.  (PSI, p.9.)  However, he 
continued to struggle to remain sober while in the community.  (See PSI, p.11.)  As 
such, the district court imposed a unified term of ten years, with five years fixed, in the 
2006 case, which it suspended for a three-year period of probation.  (See R., p.140.)   
Several months later, the State filed a motion for probation violation, alleging 
Mr. Charley absconded supervision.  (R., pp.162-65.)  The warrant on that motion was 
returned two years later, and Mr. Charley admitted to violating the terms of that 
probation.  (R., pp.169, 176.)  While the district subsequently revoked his probation, it 
retained jurisdiction over the case.  (R., pp.177-80.)  During that period of retained 
jurisdiction, Mr. Charley completed a rider program without any reported disciplinary 
issues.  (PSI, pp.26-27.)  As a result, the rider staff recommended the district court 
suspend Mr. Charley’s sentence for another period of probation.  (PSI, p.25.)  The 
                                            
1 The plea agreement also called for Mr. Charley to plead guilty to petit theft in a 
separate case (see R., p.134), but that case is not on appeal here. 
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district court agreed, ordering a term of probation “not to exceed the term of suspended 
sentence.”  (R., pp.184-86.)   
 Nearly a year later, the State filed another motion for probation violation. 
(R., pp.192-96.)  Mr. Charley admitted that violation at his initial appearance, and the 
prosecutor recommended the district court continue Mr. Charley on probation.  
(R., p.212.)  The district court did so.  (R., pp.214-15.)   
 Nearly a year later, the State filed another motion for probation violation.  
(R., pp.222-23.)  It alleged violations for committing a new crime of DUI (which was the 
basis for the 2015 case), as well as several related misdemeanors, possessing alcohol, 
not attending treatment, and not paying costs, fines, and fees.  (R., p.225.)  The DUI in 
a 2015 case was charged as a felony based on the allegation that Mr. Charley had two 
prior convictions for DUI under substantially conforming statutes in Arizona within the 
past ten years.  (R., pp.296-97.)  At his arraignment hearing, pursuant to a global plea 
agreement, Mr. Charley pled guilty to the felony DUI charge and admitted the alleged 
probation violations, while the State dismissed the other pending charges and 
recommended a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, concurrent to the 
sentence in the 2006 case.  (See R., pp.225, 318-19; Tr., p.7, Ls.8-14.)  Mr. Charley 
was free to argue for a more lenient sentence.  (R., p.319.)   
Mr. Charley explained the reason he wanted to plead guilty at the arraignment 
hearing was to take responsibility for his actions, serve his time, and get back to his 
family in North Dakota.  (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-3, p.23, Ls.19-20.)  He explained that, while on 
probation, he had been trying to get an interstate compact approved so that he could 
serve his probation closer to that support network, but had been unsuccessful.  (Tr., p.8, 
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Ls.21-25.)  Accordingly, defense counsel recommended the district court impose a 
unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed, in the 2015 case, concurrent to the 
sentence in the 2006 case.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-7.)   
In the 2006 case, the district court revoked Mr. Charley’s probation and executed 
the underlying sentence, noting he was entitled to 1,543 days of credit for time served.  
(Tr., p.25, Ls.1-5.)  In the 2015 case, it imposed and executed a concurrent sentence of 
ten years, with three years fixed.  (Tr., p.25, Ls.22-24.)  It entered the judgment of 
conviction in the 2015 case and the order revoking probation and executing sentence in 
the 2006 case on November 24, 2015.  (R., pp.232, 322.)  
Thereafter, on May 9, 2016, Mr. Charley filed Rule 35 motions in both cases, 
requesting the district court to reconsider his sentences.  (R., pp.238, 335.)  In the 2015 
case, he specifically requested the district court reduce his sentence to a unified term of 
ten years, with one and one-half years fixed.  (R., p.336.)  He simply requested leniency 
in the 2006 case.  (R., p.238.)  He submitted a letter with those motions, which provided 
information about the custody arrangement he had with his children, his employment 
history, and his concerns about the reason the 2015 DUI had been charged as a felony.  
(R., p.338.)  The district court denied both motions as untimely-filed.  (R., pp.241, 341.)  
Mr. Charley filed notices of appeal timely from the orders denying his Rule 35 motions.  
(R., pp.244, 344.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Charley’s Rule 35 
motions. 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Charley’s Rule 35 Motions 
 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.  State 
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  When petitioning for a sentence reduction 
pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in light of new 
or additional information presented to the sentencing court.  Id.  “The criteria for 
examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.”  State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).   
Mindful of the fact that I.C.R. 35(b) requires motions for leniency to be filed within 
120 days of a judgment of conviction and within 14 days of an order revoking probation, 
Mr. Charley maintains the district court should have granted his Rule 35 motions and 
reduced his sentences.  For example, he had been making efforts to continue promoting 
the goal of rehabilitation while on probation, as he had been trying to get an interstate 
compact approved which would allow him to be closer to his family.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.21-25.)  
Family constitutes an important part of a support network, which can help in 
rehabilitation.  See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010).  Additionally, he 
accepted responsibility for his most recent conduct.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.18-20.)   As such, he 
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contends the district court’s failure to reduce his sentences constitutes an abuse of its 
discretion.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Charley respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it 
deems appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that these cases be remanded to the 
district court for new decisions on his Rule 35 motions. 
 DATED this 7th day of October, 2016. 
      ______/s/___________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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